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Abstract 
The article examines the adoption of the Danish 2012 “Budget Law”. The law added 
spending ceilings, economic sanctions and mandatory balanced budgets. The law was passed 
to address the lack of cost control in Danish municipalities and asymmetrical preferences 
concerning public expenditures and can be interpreted as a credible commitment initiative 
established to ensure public expenditure control independently of the business cycle. Due to 
the economic crisis, Danish voters preferred lower public expenditures in 2011 than in 2007. 
This shift in voter preferences made it easier for the Danish Parliament to pass the Budget 
Law.  
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In 2012, the Danish Parliament adopted what was probably the most important public 
spending act ever: the so-called Budget Law.1 Behind it lies a complex story of budget 
spending overruns2, an economic crisis, concomitant crisis awareness and a desire to 
minimize the scope of expense policy. The law was adopted in order to break with thirty-five 
years of budget overruns which had resulted in comparatively high public spending growth 
(Jørgensen and Mouritzen 2005, 19). The shock and aftermath of the 2007 economic crisis, 
which hit Denmark hard (Goul Andersen 2013), triggered a political paradigm shift in which 
budget overruns were no longer acceptable.  
Theories of public expenditure traditionally point in two important and conflicting 
directions: They emphasize (1) that political institutions seldom change, and (2) that 
politicians are myopic and therefore reluctant to commit to long-term objectives (Mueller 
2003, 114-127). The Budget Law is an expression of the opposite. Flexible, but suboptimal, 
economic management has been replaced by strict legislation that limits politicians’ current 
and future spending policy options. Yet despite this, a large majority in the Danish 
                                                          
1. What we term the “Budget Law” in fact comprises several new laws and changes to existing laws. 
2. The terms “budget spending overruns” and “budget overruns” refer to situations where actual 
spending exceeds budgeted spending. 
2 
Parliament endorsed the law.  
Our research question is how it was possible for a Budget Law to be passed that will 
force politicians to limit future public spending. 
The Budget Law contains the following elements: 
 A requirement that the overall budget must be in balance or surplus.3 
 An automatic correction mechanism is triggered when public finances differ from 
the balance requirements. 
 Four-year spending ceilings for the state, municipalities and regions. Economic 
stabilizers are exempted from the spending ceilings. 
 Economic sanctions to ensure compliance with spending ceilings at all 
government tiers, including sanctions against individual municipalities and 
regions.  
 The Economic Council4 is entrusted to continually monitor compliance with 
fiscal and expenditure requirements. 
 
These five main elements are designed to ensure that politicians stick to the structural 
budget balance requirement. Balanced budgets are a combined consequence of expenditures 
and revenues. The focus of the law is to put in place spending ceilings, because in the Danish 
context spending control has historically been a serious problem. The EU Fiscal Compact 
imposes similar requirements on Denmark5. The Budget Law had already been prepared 
when the Fiscal Compact was adopted (Ministry of Finance 2011a, 8-10), and although the 
preparations for the Fiscal Compact influenced the content of the Danish law, some kind of 
budget law would have been adopted anyway.  
By all accounts, Denmark’s new fiscal regulations represent a paradigm shift 
compared to previous models of expenditure management. This article analyses the 
conditions that made such a historic institutional change possible. The article is structured as 
follows: the theoretical approach is introduced, followed by the research design and 
methods, the analysis and, finally, the conclusion.  
                                                          
3. Annual structural deficit may not exceed 0.5 percent of GDP.  
4. The Economic Council is chaired by four independent economists and served by a secretariat with 
approximately 30 employees. The other 25 members of the Council are representatives of labor and business, 
the Danish Central Bank and government organizations (www.dors.dk). 
5. The balance requirement and the correction mechanism represent the implementation of the Fiscal 
Compact (Budget Act § 2 and 3; Ministry of Finance 2012b, 6-7).  
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THEORY 
 
The article is based on rationalist theories of political behavior. They assign exogenously 
determined preferences to actors, whose actions are seen as the consequence of their own 
cost-benefit analyses, where the alternative with the highest net benefits is chosen (Buchanan 
and Tullock 1999[1962], 17). 
In the following, we present the asymmetry theorem and classic game theory, the 
idea of credible commitment, the median voter model and finally theory on intertemporal 
policy choices. After each theoretical section we present a hypothesis. 
 
The Asymmetry Theorem 
James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock coined the term “asymmetrical” in their seminal work, 
The Calculus of Consent (1962). Asymmetry stems from a fundamental difference between 
the economic and political systems. In an economic market, a buyer shows his willingness to 
pay for a good or service. This implies a symmetrical relation between "supplier" and 
"demander". In a political system, however, payment and consumption are separate: 
consumption is individualized, while payment is collectivized (Buchanan and Tullock 
1999[1962], 149-200). This makes decision makers vulnerable to organized groups which 
are able to obtain benefits that far exceed the cost of organizing.  
The asymmetry theorem predicts that interest groups will succeed in pushing 
government expenditure upwards in their area of interest due to the standard common pool 
problem (e.g. Niskanen 1971; 1973; Dunleavy 1991, 181-209; Wyplosz 2012). Our analysis 
tests the implications of the asymmetry theorem in two ways in order to take into account 
expenditure growth generated by stakeholders outside and inside the administrative system.  
An effective ceiling on total public expenditure (such as that imposed by the Budget 
Law) will raise the political costs of increased government spending in one area, because it 
will entail savings in other areas. Consequently, cost-curbing is likely to weaken expenditure 
asymmetry (Kristensen 1987, 53), which makes it relevant to examine whether this was one 
of the objectives of the Budget Law.  
The asymmetry theorem predicts that government spending will increase, but it does 
not offer an explicit theoretical explanation as to why public expenditure growth is often 
generated by budget spending overruns. However, as argued by Aaron Wildavsky (1975, 7-
4 
10) budget actors can be divided into two types: advocates of increased expenditures, and 
guardians of the treasury. Spending advocates are interested in exceeding the budget to 
obtain more funding, and they are normally more powerful than guardians of the treasury. 
The result is sub-optimal games where public spending will increase over time. This leads to 
our first hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 1: The Budget Law was adopted in an attempt to rein in dynamics that 
were driving spending upwards in the Danish political and administrative system. 
 
Credible Commitment  
The credible commitment literature points out that efficient policy outcomes require that 
political actors limit pursuit of their own short-term interests (North 1993; North and 
Weingast 1989; Schelling 1984). Absolute freedom of decision-makers does not always lead 
to optimal outcomes because with freedom comes uncertainty and inconsistency (Kydland 
and Prescott 1977, 473-474) and, in some respects, people have two selves: one short-
sighted and one long-sighted (Schelling 1984, 58f.). The classic example of a credible 
commitment is the story of Ulysses and the Sirens in Homer’s Odyssey. When Ulysses 
allowed himself to be bound to the mast, he obtained the (Pareto) optimal situation, enabling 
him to hear the Sirens’ enticing song and still make it safely home to Ithaca (Homer 1998, 
144-148; Pierson 2004, 41-43). Basically, a commitment can be credible in two ways: it can 
either be “motivationally credible” or “imperatively credible”. In the first case, an actor who 
is willing to be restricted for a limited period of time has no vested interest in more freedom; 
in the second case, the actor is restricted by credible sanctions (Shepsle 1991, 247).  
Credible commitment is a classic way to overcome the problems actors confront in 
the Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) game (Shepsle 1991, 248). The credible commitment approach 
considers the formation of budgets as a series of PD games that lead to increasing public 
spending because all political actors are myopic: politicians want to be re-elected, and voters 
are more concerned with their own needs than those of future generations (Shepsle 1991, 
251; Buchanan 1999, 99-100; Wyplosz 2012: 6). Our second hypothesis is, therefore:  
Hypothesis 2: The Budget Law was adopted in an attempt to tie political actors into 
pursuing long-term spending objectives by creating credible commitment. 
 
Median Voter Theorem 
The third theoretical approach is the median voter theorem, which predicts that parties’ 
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spending decisions will correspond to the median voter’s preferences. In Downs’ classic 
model, the political system is seen as an “economic” market where voters demand political 
decisions and politicians supply them. Voters are assumed to be rationally informed and to 
have consistent preferences (Downs 1957; see also Mueller 2003, 231). When it comes to 
public budgets, Downs (1957, 52) formulates the rule that guides political party decision-
making as follows: “... expenditures are increased until the vote-gain of the marginal dollar 
spent equals the vote-loss of the marginal dollar financed”. Thus, according to the model, 
total expenditure is determined by the median voter.  
The median voter theorem rests on four assumptions. First, it assumes the existence 
of a two-party system where political parties can move as close to the middle as they wish 
without losing votes to other parties (Downs 1957, 54). Second, voter turnout is assumed to 
be 100 percent. Third, the model includes only one political conflict dimension. Finally, the 
theorem presumes that voter preferences are typically static (Kurrild-Klitgaard 2011: 23). 
Since these assumptions do not hold water in the case studied here – notably because of the 
Danish multi-party system (cf. Grofman 2004, 27f.) – the model is used with caution. The 
third hypothesis is, therefore: 
Hypothesis 3: The Budget Law was adopted because the median voter prefers tighter 
spending due to the economic crisis. 
 
Theories on Intertemporal Policy Choices 
Within rational theory, a standard assumption is that politicians are myopic and prioritize 
short term gains over long-term objectives (Mueller 2003, 114-127). However, some theories 
point to circumstances under which governments “enact policies that impose costs on 
constituents in the short run in order to produce long-run social gains” (Jacobs 2011, 4), and 
in the real world we do find reforms which ensure that present costs are traded for future 
gains. Jacobs argues that in cases where (1) the risk of confronting electoral losses is small; 
(2) the enacting coalition considers that long term gains exceed costs; and (3) when the 
coalition has the institutional capacity to carry through the desired policy changes, future 
gains may actually neutralize short-term costs (Jacob 2011, 29; see also 2008, 203ff.). Our 
fourth and final hypothesis is, thus:  
Hypothesis 4: The Budget Law was adopted because the enacting coalition calculated 
electoral costs to be small, future gains to be large, and because it possessed the 
institutional capacity to carry through the reform. 
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DESIGN AND METHOD 
 
The article is a single case study of the adoption of the Danish Budget Law. This means that 
it is practically impossible to single out individual causal effects. The above hypotheses are 
therefore neither competing nor mutually exclusive. Rather, we investigate how the interplay 
between theoretical explanations may have triggered the adoption of the Budget Law.  
Since the hypotheses refer to a wide range of empirical phenomena, the article draws 
on several types of data: descriptive statistics, interviews, data from the Danish election 
survey, and secondary data. Eight interviews were conducted with six senior civil servants 
from the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Economic Affairs and the Interior, the Danish 
Economic Council, chief economists representing the Danish municipalities and regions, and 
two representatives of the two major political parties (Liberals and Social Democrats). The 
interviewees who acted as informants for the study all played an important role in the 
adoption of the law. Quantitative data from the Danish election survey is used to assess 
voters’ attitudes towards the government’s expenditure policy. The survey, which has been 
carried out after each general election since 1971, allows us to follow changes in voters’ 
expenditure policy preferences over the years (Stubager et al. 2013, 7). Luckily, general 
elections were held in 2007 (before the crisis erupted) and in 2011 (when the crisis had been 
underway for a few years). This coincidence makes it possible to estimate how the economic 
crisis affected crisis awareness, and whether this made it possible for political decision-
makers to pass reforms, though we still cannot single out the effects of individual variables.  
 
ANALYSIS 
 
The analysis consists of four sections. A brief presentation of events preceding the adoption 
of the Budget Law is followed by three sections in which each hypothesis is analyzed. The 
conclusion discusses how the factors considered in the analysis explain the institutional 
changes represented by the Budget Law. 
Both the OECD and the IMF have often recommended the introduction of clearer 
fiscal rules, independent fiscal guardians, and a top-down budgeting system (Davidsen and 
Jensen 2012, 19). Danish decision-makers were also inspired by the Swedish Budget Law of 
1996, which established a spending ceiling for government expenditures at state level 
7 
(Ministry of Finance 2010, 238), and by the upcoming debate in the EU on the need for 
tighter fiscal rules (which eventually led to the Fiscal Compact). The seemingly successful 
Swedish ceiling model was well known among Danish decision-makers and provided them 
with crucial inspiration, which is fully in line with the predictions of rationalistic policy 
learning (Meseguer 2006).  
It has been asserted that the Budget Law is a direct result of the Fiscal Compact. This 
is imprecise. The Fiscal Compact was adopted in December 2011, but the Danish Ministry 
of Finance’s budget statement of May 2010 already referred to the Swedish Budget Law as 
an example to follow (Ministry of Finance 2010, 235). Immediately after, the Liberal-
Conservative government made plans to introduce a budget model that resembled the model 
in the current Budget Law (Ministry of Finance 2011, 8-10). Because of the upcoming 
general election in September 2011, the Budget Law was not passed until June 2012. It was 
passed by a very large majority in Parliament, consisting of the governing parties (Social 
Liberals, Social Democrats, and Socialist People’s Party), the Liberals, and the 
Conservatives (Ministry of Finance 2012c). Nevertheless, the ongoing debate in EU circles 
on tighter fiscal rules was part of the backdrop of the Danish Budget law. Had the Budget 
Law not been adopted, Denmark would have implemented the Fiscal Compact by adopting 
rules that are equivalent only to part of the present Budget Law.  
 
Hypothesis 1: Asymmetry 
The analysis of Hypothesis 1 proceeds as follows. We document the growth in Danish public 
spending, and we establish its relationship to the asymmetry theorem and the Budget Law; 
we uncover the relationship between municipal and regional overspending and the adoption 
of the Budget Law; and we test the implications of the asymmetry theorem with data from 
the Danish election survey.  
The asymmetry theorem can be examined in two ways: by considering whether 
public expenditure growth can be explained as a response to asymmetrical cost driving 
dynamics, or by examining whether the players’ preferences reflect instrumental self-interest 
maximizing as prescribed by the theory (Kristensen 1987, 56). 
In 1960, public spending made up approximately 25 percent of Danish GDP, which 
placed Denmark well below other European countries and even below the United States. 
Over the next 20 years, Denmark underwent a massive public spending growth, and by 1980 
the expenditure ratio had increased to 56.9 percent, surpassed only by Sweden. Typically, 
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about half of public spending consists of consumption; the rest is assigned to income 
transfers, public investments and other expenses. Income transfers and public investment 
rose sharply until 2010.6 This was partly due to the fact that GDP declined during the crisis, 
and partly due to fiscal priorities in advance of investments. Government consumption also 
rose sharply until 2010 (Ministry of Finance 2010, 31). Ceteris paribus, high growth in 
public consumption expenditures indicates that growth is driven by asymmetry.  
In Denmark, municipalities generally account for 50 percent of public consumption, 
the state level for 30 percent, and the regions for 20 percent (Danmarks Nationalbank 2012, 
78). The central government planned a 1 percent rise per year in public consumption from 
1993 to 2001, but in reality this rose by 2.5 percent. This pattern repeated itself between 
2002 and 2010, when the planned maximum 0.9 percent real growth in public consumption 
ended up at 1.6 percent growth. On average, public consumption growth was over twice as 
high as planned between 1993 and 2010 (see Ministry of Finance 2012b, 4).  
All interviewees mentioned the apparently uncontrollable growth in spending from 
the 1990s onwards as one of the key reasons why the Budget Law was adopted. Hence, the 
adoption of the Budget Law can be interpreted as an attempt to reduce the asymmetrical 
pressure on government spending. Our informants emphasised that the municipal budget 
overruns were decisive in this regard. Below, we conduct a game theoretical analysis of 
budget overruns in relation to the adoption of the Budget Law. 
 
Hypothesis 1: Before and after the Budget Law 
The first part of the analysis in the remainder of this section focuses on the dynamics that 
enabled the municipal budget overruns prior to the enactment of the Budget Law. The 
second part examines the process that led to the adoption of the Budget Law. 
We focus on the Danish municipalities since all our informants mentioned municipal 
budget overruns as one of the key reasons behind the adoption of the Budget Law; however, 
the analysis could also be applied to the Danish regions as they are subject to the same 
bargaining system. 
Three features of the former agreements between central and local government are of 
particular importance for the analysis. First, the annual agreements were not legally binding 
for municipalities and regions. Second, the agreements applied to municipalities and regions 
                                                          
6. Since the Danish crown is pegged to the euro, Denmark can only use fiscal policy to stimulate the 
economy. 
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as a whole. Thus, for example, if one municipality increased spending but another reduced it 
by the same amount, the agreement was still respected. Third, the government (with a 
majority in Parliament) had the formal power to impose collective economic sanctions on 
municipalities and regions if they exceeded their budget. However, successive governments 
refrained from doing so on numerous occasions (Serritzlew and Blom-Hansen 2008, 168). 
The Budget Law reverses the above as it introduces spending ceilings for operational 
expenses, which comprise approximately 70 percent of municipal expenditure (Budget Law 
§ 5). Contrary to previously, municipalities are now sanctioned individually if they exceed 
spending limits. 
From the perspective of public choice theory, the problem is that without spending 
ceilings both local politicians and their employees have incentives to expand public services 
(Howlett and Ramesh 1995, 19-20; Buchanan 1984, 133). In addition, individual 
municipalities have no incentive to save money due to the collective character of the annual 
economic agreements. Thus, the n-player game “Tragedy of the Commons” arises because 
municipalities maximise their own spending, resulting in a suboptimal outcome: the total 
budget is exceeded. The “Tragedy of the Commons” is a version of the individualistic PD 
with more players (all municipalities, i.e. n > 2) (Ostrom et al. 2006, 5; Ostrom 1990, 2-5). 
Figure 1 illustrates the game with two municipalities; however, the logic is the same as with 
the n-player game. 
FIGURE 1 
Individualistic game: Municipals exceeding budget 
 Municipality 2 
Does not exceed 
the budget 
Exceeds the 
budget 
Municipality 1 
Does not exceed 
the budget 
B 
 
B 
A 
 
D 
Exceeds the 
budget 
D 
 
A 
C 
 
C 
(equilibrium) 
 
All municipalities have an incentive to exceed their budget. This is empirically supported. 
Between 1980 and 2010, the municipalities as a whole complied with their budget 
agreements in only nine out of thirty years (Serritzlew and Blom-Hansen 2008, 170; 
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Danmarks Nationalbank 2012, 78-79). This pattern is reinforced by the fact that budgets are 
exceeded by greater amounts when a local election is approaching. This political business 
cycle is a well-known problem (Mouritzen 1989). Furthermore, budget overruns are 
exceeded by the largest amounts over issues where voters and local government employees 
have the strongest preferences, i.e. those related to pre-school children, the elderly and 
schools (Serritzlew and Blom-Hansen 2008, 152). 
Why have the above dynamics among municipalities been permitted to develop 
without sanctions from incumbent governments? We may find answers to this in the 
interplay between the government and the opposition. The economic sanctions ‘game’ can 
be considered as a competitive PD (Suenson 2013, 128). It follows logically from the 
asymmetry theorem that the political parties both in government and in opposition have only 
a modest interest in sanctioning budget overruns, as this could be interpreted as an 
unacceptable reduction in citizen-related welfare (Houlberg and Mouritzen 2011). Our 
interviewees confirmed this and emphasized that before the economic crisis, welfare state 
services were politically important, making cost control difficult. Successive governments 
did not sanction municipalities because they were playing the ongoing zero-sum game for 
seats in Parliament (zero-sum since there are only 179 seats in the Danish Parliament). 
The game’s simplified logic illustrates why it has historically been difficult for the 
central government to sanction municipalities while simultaneously playing the eternal zero-
sum game to secure votes from the opposition in Parliament (Figure 2). 
FIGURE 2. 
Competitive game: Municipals exceeding budget – BEFORE the Budget Law 
 Opposition 
Sanctioning No sanction 
Incumbent 
government 
Sanctioning  
0 
 
0 
A 
 
-A 
No sanction  
-A 
 
A 
0 
 
0 
(equilibrium) 
 
The games illustrate two mutually reinforcing dynamics: the municipalities have an 
incentive to exceed their budgets, which they have done; and the government has little 
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incentive to sanction them. This is supported empirically as budget overruns became more 
frequent, and larger, towards 2009 (Holdt-Olesen and Panduro 2010, 1). The analysis thus 
illustrates why it was possible for municipalities to exceed their budgets year after year 
without being sanctioned by the government. The next section addresses how the Budget 
Law was most likely adopted in an attempt to stop these dynamics. 
In 2009, the municipalities registered the largest budget overrun ever. As pointed out 
by all informants, the economic crisis fundamentally changed the political agenda with 
regard to public expenditure management. Previous marginal budget spending overruns were 
replaced by large overruns in the midst of a serious economic crisis. In game theory jargon, a 
new equilibrium in the competitive game was established after the crisis, which encouraged 
the government and some of the opposition parties to work towards a solution to the 
seemingly ever increasing public expenditures; i.e. the Budget Law was made part of the 
decision making arena, cf. Figure 3. 
FIGURE 3. 
Competitive game: Municipals exceeding budget – AFTER the Budget Law 
 Opposition 
Cooperation Non-cooperation 
Incumbent 
government 
Cooperation 
0 
 
0 (new 
equilibrium ) 
-A 
 
A 
Non-cooperation 
A 
 
-A 
0 
 
0 
 
All informants mentioned that the equilibrium of the game changed after the economic crisis 
because politicians were able to adopt the Budget Law without facing massive resistance 
from voters and interest groups. Changes in voter preferences therefore arguably constituted 
a key causal mechanism in the adoption of the Budget Law, an assumption that will be 
further verified below. 
According to the asymmetry theorem, public spending will increase if groups with 
focused interests push decision-makers to furnish them with private goods. In the election 
survey, voters were asked whether too little, adequate or too much money was spent on 
selected expenditure items. It is possible to isolate the voters who receive the benefits in 
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question under four items: education, old age pensions, unemployment benefits, and welfare 
benefits. A multiple regression analysis (robust OLS and ordered logistic regression) can test 
whether recipients of one of these benefits prefer higher spending on the various items than 
non-recipients. Further, we can control for relevant background variables such as gender, 
age, income, and left/right self-location7 and thus test whether the beneficiaries have “self-
interest maximising” preferences in 2007 and 2011 as the asymmetry theorem prescribes. 
The dependent variable in the regression analyses ranges from -1 (too much money) 
to 1 (too little) and the intermediate category is 0 (adequate).8 A positive beta 
estimate/coefficient indicates that the beneficiaries prefer higher spending on these items; a 
negative indicates the opposite. Since we will not comment on other control variables, they 
do not appear below.  
Overall, the 2007 regression models support the asymmetry theorem’s assumptions 
about actors’ preferences. Beneficiaries of education, unemployment benefits and welfare 
benefits all prefer significantly higher spending on their “own” welfare benefits than the 
general population. Only the 2007 models regarding old age pensions are insignificant. 
Furthermore, it appears from the models’ R2 that none of the models can explain more than 
16.2 percent of the variation in the dependent variable, indicating that voters’ expense policy 
preferences are more complex than the asymmetry theorem prescribes. The figures suggest 
that it is plausible that the recipients’ preferences constituted an upward pressure on 
spending levels in 2007, and as shown above, public consumption in particular rose until the 
crisis erupted. 
The Budget Law can be interpreted as an attempt to combat this upward pressure. 
The Law made it harder for politicians to fulfill everyone’s spending preferences as this 
would lead to an overrun of spending ceilings. Hence, the adoption of the Budget Law can 
be seen as an attempt to reduce the fragmentation of decision-making and the resulting 
asymmetry in order to stop growth in public spending.  
 
                                                          
7. It is not possible to control for education because of differences in the survey questions in 2007 and 
2011. Age is not used as a control variable in the regression models regarding old age pensions since eligibility 
is dependent on age. 
8. The dependent variable only has three categories and is not interval scaled. Still, robust OLS results 
are reported because they are easily interpretable (robust OLS models are used since the dependent variable 
with three categories results in heteroscedasticity). The results are basically the same when the regression 
analysis is performed as ordered logistic regressions. N is larger in 2007 than in 2011, which all else equal 
makes the 2007 models more significant than the 2011 models. However, n is over 770 in every model, so this 
anti-conservative effect is relatively unproblematic. 
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TABLE 1 
Users’/beneficiaries’ estimation of actual consumption of the selected items of 
expenditures, 2007 and 2011 
Results Constant 
Beta estimates 
(robust OLS 
regression) R2 
Ordered logistic 
regression 
coefficient N 
Education 2007 .886 (.076)*** .231 (.057)*** .083 1.181 (.341)*** 2374 
Education 2011 .835 (.101)*** .060 (.069) .059 .336 (.339) 834 
      
Old age pensions 2007 .956 (.052)*** -.025 (.029) .063 -.120 (.119) 2362 
Old age pensions 2011 .460 (.071)*** .258 (.053)*** .030 .575 (.198)*** 820 
S      
Unemployment benefits 
2007 
.456 (.067)*** .292 (.104)*** .118 1.303 (.484)*** 2347 
Unemployment benefits 
2011 
.318 (.091)*** .117 (.101) .108 .439 (.479) 818 
      
Welfare benefits 2007 .483 (.074)*** .426 (.270)* .162 1.639 (1.031)* 2338 
Welfare benefits 2011 .250 (.102)*** .176 (.188) .143 .507 (.772) 770 
Note: Standard errors in brackets, *significant at 0.1 level, **significant at 0.05 level, ***significant at 0.01 
level. All models showed weaknesses in terms of normally distributed errors and homoscedasticity. 
 
Table 1 also shows the corresponding preferences measured in 2011 after voters had 
experienced a severe economic crisis over the past three years. Unlike the 2007 figures, the 
2011 figures do not support the asymmetry theorem since the correlations for education, 
unemployment and social welfare are insignificant. Only recipients of old age pensions 
prefer significantly more spending in this area. The asymmetry theorem can therefore not be 
corroborated in three out of four models. This is interesting for two reasons. 
First, it matches previous research which shows that self-interest maximizing 
preferences decrease in times of crisis (Christiansen 1990, 443; Goul Andersen 1993, 173; 
Stubager et al. 2014). Second, it was probably easier to adopt the Budget Law because of 
this change in preferences. The political problems associated with implementing spending 
ceilings are invariably smaller when pressure from users and interest groups decreases. 
In conclusion, the Budget Law appears to have been adopted to limit the common 
pool problems which led to budget overruns, and to rectify political asymmetry. Overall, 
therefore, we find support for Hypothesis 1. 
 
Hypothesis 2: Credible Commitment  
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This section analyses the motives behind the Budget Law from the point of view of the 
credible commitment literature. It examines whether the Budget Law was passed in order to 
ensure long-term, credible control over public expenditure. 
Most informants mention the Budget Law as an initiative taken to deprive national, 
municipal and regional politicians of fiscal discretion. All informants further note that 
existing fiscal priorities have not been consistent. The Budget Law is seen as an attempt to 
create a credible binding of expenditure policy to ensure that the development of public 
expenditure remains within the planned framework when the business cycle turns around and 
crisis awareness fades. The Budget Law lashes politicians to the mast before the 
(asymmetrical) sirens’ song begins again and public spending growth becomes difficult to 
control. 
The consumption objectives and economic agreements between the government and 
the municipalities were actually met as of 2011 (Ministry of Economic Affairs and the 
Interior 2012). At first glance, it is surprising that the Budget Law was introduced at a time 
when expenditure policy objectives were being respected and when pressure on spending 
was limited. 2011 was the first year since 1990 that government spending had dropped, and 
one must go as far back as 1984 to find a larger decrease in government spending (Ministry 
of Finance 2012d: 48).  
The Budget Law’s adoption in 2012 can be seen as a sign that the government and 
the opposition wished to stop playing the ongoing competitive PD. As budget overruns grew 
in the years up to 2009, and because the municipalities also overran their budgets in 2010, 
the idea of a new budget regime to stop overruns gained force in the years that followed. 
Under the Budget Law, penalties are no longer adopted by discretion in Parliament. Instead, 
sanctioning mechanisms and spending ceilings are automatized, which makes it much easier 
to adopt and adhere to strict spending ceilings. The Budget Law may be interpreted as an 
institutional blame avoidance mechanism that the major political parties in Parliament, in 
particular, can refer to when the spending cut debate rages (Jensen et al. 2008, 117). 
Overall, the Budget Law can be seen as a classic credible commitment initiative. The 
Law limits fiscal discretion by political actors and thereby constrains the competitive PD in 
Parliament. The analysis has shown that spending ceilings and sanction mechanisms in the 
Budget Law were enacted in order to bind political actors. 
Several countries have adopted fiscal rules as a response to the crisis to ensure a 
balanced budget in the long term (Budina et al. 2012). The Danish Ministry of Finance 
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(2012a) has explicitly stated its desire to avoid the problems created by a large, interest-
bearing debt. Thus, for two reasons, the balance requirements of the Budget Law can be seen 
as emanating from the credible commitment idea. 
First, the Budget Law is aligned with Buchanan’s recommendation – which 
operationalizes the credible commitment concept – to subscribe to the U.S. Constitution 
ideal, which does not allow government budget deficits (Buchanan and Wagner 2000, 187). 
Second, the credible commitment literature underlines that actions are influenced by 
expectations about the future. If investors fear that public debt will increase, they will 
demand a higher yield on Danish government bonds (see Breen and McMenamin 2013). The 
credibility of the balance requirement was significantly strengthened by a large majority in 
Parliament which endorsed the passing of the Budget Law, reducing the likelihood that the 
law will be abolished after a general election, and thereby keeping Denmark in line with the 
requirements of the Fiscal Compact. 
All credible commitment initiatives in politics involve a trade-off between discretion 
and commitment. Several informants argued that the constraints introduced by the Budget 
Law also entail political costs. For example, the four-year budget ceilings make it harder to 
both ease and tighten fiscal policy in forthcoming years.  
The balance between discretion and commitment is addressed by exempting most 
cyclical spending, such as unemployment benefits, from spending ceilings. The Budget Law 
allows most expenditure to be tied while allowing automatic stabilizers to operate freely 
(Ministry of Finance 2012b: 2). 
Overall, we find support for Hypothesis 2: our informants see the Budget Law as an 
attempt to limit politicians’ future room for fiscal maneuver. It is also seen as an attempt to 
avoid the sub-optimal Nash equilibrium in the PD game (even though the informants did not 
express it in these terms). 
 
Hypothesis 3: Median Voter Theorem 
In this section, the median voter theorem is used as a theoretical guideline to empirically test 
whether the economic crisis resulted in changes in voter preferences. We use data from the 
Danish election survey. The basic premise of the following part of the analysis is that if the 
median voter prefers tighter spending after the crisis, the Budget Law will be easier to pass. 
The median voter theorem provides a simple foundation to analyze the consequences of 
changes in voter preferences regarding public spending.  
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Kristensen (1982, 40) uses a simple and logically consistent test of the median voter 
theorem based on voter preferences. The premise is that if spending in a given policy area is 
close to the median voter’s preferences, the same number of voters believes that the 
government is spending “too much” and “too little”. It is possible to test this using data from 
the Danish election survey, which asked voters whether they believed that money spent on 
14 different items was too little, adequate or too much.9  
The response category “too much money” is assigned the value -1; “adequate” the 
value 0; and “too little money” the value 1. The three categories can be combined into an 
overall measure of voters’ expenditure preference on each item, which is termed ‘PDI 
values’ (Percentage Difference Index), and is obtained by subtracting the share of 
respondents who answered “too much money” from those who answered “too little money”. 
The index can take values from -1 to 1. PDI values are shown in Table 2 for each 
expenditure item in 2007 and 2011.  
TABLE 2 
PDI values for the expenditure items 
Expenditure item and year 
yearearUdgiftspost og år 
PDI 2007 PDI 2011 Diff. Sig. N 2007 N 2011 
Defense  -.373 (.010) -.492 (.019) -.119 (.000)*** 3913 985 
Healthcare .735 (.007) .562 (.018) -.173 (.000)*** 3994 1003 
Education .570 (.008) .650 (.016) .080 (.000)*** 3957 1000 
Old age pensions .474 (.008) .340 (.017) -.134 (.000)*** 3935 980 
Environment .501 (.009) .405 (.020) -.096 (.000)*** 3918 974 
Culture -.174 (.010) -.333 (.020) -.159 (.000)*** 3920 976 
Kindergartens and nurseries  .517 (.009) .603 (.017) .086 (.000)*** 3927 982 
Unemployment benefits 
benefitshedsunderstøttelse til 
den enkelte 
.087 (.008) .132 (.018) .044 (.016)** 3888 972 
Welfare benefits .084 (.009) .040 (.022) -.044 (.046)** 3852 911 
Foreign aid -.019 (.012) -.189 (.022) -.170 (.000)*** 3927 967 
Refugees and immigrants  .037 (.012) -.127 (.022) -.163 (.000)*** 3917 940 
Home care .701 (.008) .682 (.016) -.020 (.257) 3962 971 
Motorways and bridges .122 (.011) -.101 (.020) -.222 (.000)*** 3927 974 
Police .614 (.009) .369 (.019) -.245 (.000)*** 3931 973 
Note: Standard errors in brackets, *significant: 0.1 level, **significant: 0.05 level, ***significant: 0.01 level. 
 
The median voter theorem is rejected in both 2007 and 2011 as most PDI values are 
much higher or lower than 0. Only five of the 28 PDI values are closer to 0 than +/-0.1. PDI 
values are far below 0, and only eight of the 28 PDI values are negative.  
                                                          
9. The response categories refer to public expenditure on different items at the time the election survey 
is conducted. Since costs may change between elections, different responses may be due to spending changes. 
However, we interpret changes in response submissions as signs of changing preferences. 
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According to the median voter theorem, political parties could reap more votes by 
increasing government spending and thereby wooing the median voter. The theorem can thus 
help explain the growth in public spending until the crisis. However, the Budget Law cannot 
be seen as consistent with the median voter theorem. That said, the formulation of the 
questions could lead to bias because they do not force voters to take into account the tax 
consequences of higher government spending – the so-called fiscal illusion (Courant et al. 
1980; Kristensen 1987, 154). Furthermore, voters often have inconsistent preferences for 
spending and taxes (Winter and Mouritzen 2001). 
Nevertheless, the results are relevant for an analysis of the adoption of the Budget 
Law because some of the PDI values decreased from 2007 to 2011, indicating that voters 
preferred lower public spending after the crisis. We assume that the Budget Law – all else 
being equal – results in tighter public spending, which often leads to negative voter 
reactions. If voters’ preferences for more expenditure eased in 2011 compared to 2007, this 
may be interpreted as a factor contributing to the adoption of the Budget Law. 
Table 2 shows, for each expenditure item, the difference between the PDI values and 
a test of significance that indicates whether the PDI values for the two years differ 
significantly. On 10 out of the 14 items, voters prefer significantly lower spending in 2011 
than in 2007.10 Only for three items (unemployment benefits, education and 
kindergartens/nurseries) do voters prefer significantly higher spending. In conclusion, 
voters’ preferences have changed significantly in 13 out of the 14 expenditure categories. 
We cannot conclude unequivocally that voters prefer lower public spending, as some 
responses may reflect changes in attitudes towards issues not related to expenditure policy; 
and because aggregate spending preferences must be analyzed separately. A factor analysis 
has therefore been conducted in order to address these questions (see online appendix at 
https://nedergaard.wordpress.com ). The conclusion in the appendix is that the above result 
holds true even when changes in values in voter preferences are taken into account and 
expenditure preferences have been aggregated in indexes. 
 
Hypothesis 4: Intertemporal Public Policy  
According to the fourth Hypothesis, the Law was endorsed because of (1) low risk of 
electoral loss, (2) because the enacting coalition considered that the gains exceeded the costs, 
                                                          
10 Voters may also prefer lower spending on home care, but this result is insignificant. 
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and (3) because the governing coalition had the institutional means to carry through the 
reform. As regards electoral losses, we have already shown that, following the economic 
crisis, the electorate had come to prefer lower public spending than before. To this we can 
add that the Law was carried through in Parliament by the minority coalition government 
(Social Democrats, Social Liberals, and Socialist People’s Party) parties and two opposition 
parties: the Liberals and the Conservatives. These two parties are traditionally considered to 
be government candidates, and have earlier been part of several centre-right governments. 
The three parties voting against the Law – the Unity List (a left-wing party), the Danish 
People’s Party (a right-wing populist party) and the Liberal Alliance (an ultra-liberal party) 
are the only political parties represented in Parliament that have never been part of a 
government coalition. In sum, the Law was carried through by the parties that were (at that 
time) part of the government, together with the parties that will most likely join the 
government when the majority in Parliament changes. Potential blame would, therefore, be 
shared by all government candidate parties.  
It is difficult to gain a precise picture of the enacting coalition’s assessment of present 
costs and future gains, because political communication is always strategic. However, when 
we examine debates about the topic in Parliament, the proponent parties’ speakers pointed to 
such future gains as important in sustaining a strong economy and continued international 
confidence in the Danish economy. It is fair to interpret these statements as an indication of 
their genuine faith in the future gains expected as a result of the Law 
(www.ft.dk/samling/20111/lovforslag/L174). Furthermore, opponents of the Law were 
deeply divided as to its implications: The Unity List opposed it due to the fact that they 
wanted a more expansive fiscal policy, whereas Liberal Alliance preferred budget cuts. The 
Danish People’s Party was somewhere in between on this matter. In addition, all the 
opposition parties were against the Law because in their view it had been forced upon 
Denmark by the Fiscal Compact. This treaty was, however, strongly supported by the 
majority of the pro EU parties (Betænkning over Forslag til Budgetlov 2012).  
The final condition – that the proponents have the institutional capacity to enact the political 
investment – is met since the law was voted in by a very large majority in Parliament.  
We conclude this section by endorsing Hypothesis 4. It was mainly the possibility of 
securing a broad majority in support of the Law among the so-called “parties in government” 
which enabled the enacting coalition to trade present costs for future gains.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
The analyses show that institutional change, in this case, was driven by a number of 
concurrent factors. More than one logic of institutional change was at play. Still, the 
institutional approach can certainly help to explain why the Budget Law was adopted. The 
adoption of the Budget Law should be seen as a consequence both of endogenous and 
exogenous factors. 
The old public expenditure governance model led to increasingly larger budget 
spending overruns, especially in the municipalities, and since possible sanctions had to be 
adopted discretionarily, they often did not materialize. This signaled to the municipalities 
that budget overruns would not be sanctioned. Hence, the institutional outcome created a 
need for automatic and individual sanctions. In addition, the economic crisis post 2008 
resulted in an exogenous shock. The crisis affected the two main stakeholders: some groups 
of payment recipients developed more sociotropic preferences; and voters preferred 
significantly lower public expenditures when the Budget Law was adopted than at the time 
the economic crisis began. 
Hypotheses 1 and 2 – on spending containment and credible commitments – are 
supported. First, public spending was increasing as the Budget Law was adopted and the 
objectives for growth in public consumption had been exceeded. This is consistent with the 
asymmetry theorem. Second, and more importantly, the municipalities had experienced 
significant budget overruns. In order to put an end to the resulting collective action dilemma, 
the collective nature of the economic agreements was supplemented by individual financial 
penalties against municipalities and regions. Hence, the Budget Law can be seen as an 
attempt to prevent expenditure growth driven both by asymmetry and budget overruns. This 
conclusion is further strengthened by our quantitative tests of the asymmetry theorem that 
showed interest groups to have individual utility-maximizing preferences in 2007. However, 
preferences proved to be dynamic and voters’ preferences were less expenditure expansive in 
2011 than in 2007.  
If the economic scenario improves in the future, crisis awareness is expected to 
decline, and preferences are predicted to return to a more self-interest maximizing level. 
Therefore, the Budget Law was adopted – in line with Hypothesis 2 – as a credible 
commitment initiative to prevent future collapse of spending restraint. Overall, we find 
support for Hypothesis 2 because the Budget Law restricts politicians’ current as well as 
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future fiscal maneuvers. 
Hypothesis 3 about the median voter was somewhat corroborated, as the analysis 
clarified that voters’ expenditure policy preferences shifted towards significantly lower 
public spending in 2011 than in 2007, even when value political changes in voter preferences 
are taken into account. This shift in voter preferences probably made it possible to introduce 
the fiscal tightening proposed by the Budget Law. 
Hypothesis 4 on intertemporal policy choices was also supported. The coalition that 
carried through the Law was deliberately broad in an attempt to limit punishment by the 
electorate. In this way, the politicians sought to reduce the disincentive to trade present costs 
for future gains that typically prevents decision makers from passing such legislation.   
In recent years, Denmark has implemented reforms in areas that previously would 
have been very difficult to change, including early retirement, unemployment benefits, social 
welfare, and economic support for students. The economic crisis made otherwise very 
difficult reforms possible and opened the way for changes elsewhere in Europe, many of 
them far more radical than those implemented in Denmark. If nothing else, these experiences 
show that it is possible to intervene radically in hard-to-change political and economic 
institutions. Time will reveal the long-term effects. It is also too early to tell whether crisis 
awareness or the Budget Law ultimately ensures budget compliance. 
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